A New Measure for Conditional Mutual Information and its Properties

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Abstract — **We propose a new conditional mutual information measure, called the *reduced intrinsic information*, and show its significance in the context of determining the number of secret-key bits that can be extracted from distributed information by public communication.**

I. The Reduced Intrinsic Information

The *secret-key rate* $S(X;Y||Z)$ of a tripartite probability distribution P_{XYZ} is the rate at which two parties, knowing realizations of X and Y, respectively, can generate, by public communication, common bits about which a third party, who has access to Z, remains almost completely ignorant [1]. It is a fundamental problem to express $S(X;Y||Z)$ in terms of P_{XYZ}. In [2], the *intrinsic information* $I(X;Y\downarrow Z) := \inf_{P_{\overline{Z}|Z}}(I(X;Y|\overline{Z}))$ was shown to be an upper bound on $S(X;Y||Z)$. (Here, the infimum is taken over all possible ways the third party Eve can process her information Z.)

The following facts were shown in [3] and imply that this bound is, however, *not tight*: First, we have for all P_{XYZU} that $S(X;Y||ZU) \geq S(X;Y||Z) - H(U)$ holds, whereas, secondly, the intrinsic information does *not* have this property which we will call *smoothness* (and which the usual mutual information $I(X;Y|Z)$ clearly has). Intuitively speaking, $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ fails to be smooth since *additional* side information U can also help the adversary to use the *previous* information Z more effectively, thereby reducing the information shared by the legitimate partners by more than just $H(U)$.

These observations lead to a stronger upper bound on $S(X;Y||Z)$, namely the largest smooth lower bound on the intrinsic information, which we call *reduced intrinsic information*.

Definition 1. The *reduced intrinsic information between* X *and* Y*, given* Z, is

$$I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z) = \inf_{P_{U|XYZ}} \left(\inf_{P_{\overline{Z}|ZU}} (I(X;Y|\overline{Z})) + H(U) \right) .$$

II. Properties

According to the above discussion, the reduced intrinsic information measure is an upper bound on the secret-key rate,

$$S(X;Y||Z) \leq I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z) .$$

As sketched already, it can be strictly smaller than the previous bound $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ because possible refinements, using some side information U, of Eve's strategy for minimizing the correlation shared by the other parties are taken into account. It is important to note, however, that Eve, knowing Z but not U, cannot actually apply these strategies; their mere existence, however, allows for improving the bound.

Theorem 1. *Let* P_{XYZ} *be a distribution, and let* $\mathcal{E}_1, \mathcal{E}_2, \ldots, \mathcal{E}_n$ *be disjoint events with probabilities* $\mathrm{Prob}\,[\mathcal{E}_i] = p_i$ *such that* $\sum_i p_i = 1$*. Then*

$$I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i I(X;Y\downarrow Z\,|\,\mathcal{E}_i) + H([p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n]) .$$

In order to derive, from Theorem 1, the mentioned fact that $I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z)$ can be strictly smaller than $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$, we consider the special case where P_{XYZ} is composed in a certain way by two distributions—for which Eve's strategies of minimizing the information are a priori different. Then, $I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z)$ takes "adaptive" strategies, i.e., separate minimization, into account, whereas $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ only allows for one global minimization, i.e., one single channel $P_{\overline{Z}|Z}$.

Corollary 2. *Let* P_{XYZ} *be a distribution, let* $\mathcal{X}$ *and* $\mathcal{Y}$ *be the ranges of* X *and* Y*, respectively, let* $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_0 \cup \mathcal{X}_1$ *(where* $\mathcal{X}_0$ *and* $\mathcal{X}_1$ *are disjoint) and analogously* $\mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{Y}_0 \cup \mathcal{Y}_1$*, such that* $P_{XYZ}(x,y,z) = 0$ *if* $x \in \mathcal{X}_0$ *and* $y \in \mathcal{Y}_1$ *or vice versa, and let* $p = \mathrm{Prob}\,[x \in \mathcal{X}_0]$*. We denote by* $P^0_{XYZ} = P_{X^0Y^0Z^0}$ *the distribution* $P_{XYZ|\mathcal{E}_0}$*, and analogously for* $\mathcal{E}_1$*. Then we have*

$$\begin{aligned} I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z) \quad \leq \quad & p \cdot \inf_{P_{\overline{Z}^0|Z^0}} \left(I(X^0;Y^0|\overline{Z}^0) \right) + \\ & (1-p) \cdot \inf_{P_{\overline{Z}^1|Z^1}} \left(I(X^1;Y^1|\overline{Z}^1) \right) + h(p) . \end{aligned}$$

Based on the bound of Corollary 2 it is not difficult to find distributions for which $I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z) < I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ holds [3]. In combination with another result of [3], stating that the intrinsic information $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ is a lower bound on the rate at which secret-key bits are required to *generate* a secret correlation P_{XYZ} by pubic communication, the gap between $I(X;Y\downarrow Z)$ and $I(X;Y\downarrow\downarrow Z)$ implies that some distributions do not allow for the extraction of the same number of secret-key bits as are needed to generate them (in fact, these quantities can differ by an arbitrarily large factor). Interestingly, a similar phenomenon is already well-known for mixed bipartite quantum states.

References

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