

# Simple and Efficient Single Round almost Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Tolerating Generalized Adversary

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**Abstract.** Patra et al. (IJACT '09) gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of *almost perfectly secure message transmission* protocols<sup>1</sup> tolerating *general, non-threshold*  $Q^2$  adversary structure. However, their protocol requires *at least three* rounds and performs *exponential* (exponential in the size of the adversary structure) computation and communication. They have left it as an open problem to design efficient protocol for almost perfectly secure message transmission, tolerating  $Q^2$  adversary structure.

In this paper, we show the first *single* round almost perfectly secure message transmission protocol tolerating  $Q^2$  adversary structure. The computation and communication complexities of the protocol are both *polynomial* in the size of underlying *linear secret sharing scheme* (LSSS). This solves the open problem posed by Patra et al.

When we restrict our general protocol to a *threshold adversary*, we obtain a single round, *communication optimal* almost secure message transmission protocol tolerating threshold adversary, which is much more *computationally efficient* and *relatively simpler* than the previous single round, communication optimal protocol of Srinathan et al. (PODC '08).

**Keywords:** Information theoretic security, non-threshold adversary, Byzantine corruption, Efficiency.

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\* Financial Support from Department of Information Technology, Govt. of India Acknowledged.

\*\* Financial Support from Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets, Denmark Acknowledged.

<sup>1</sup> Patra et al. [25] called this problem as *unconditionally secure message transmission* (USMT).

## 1 Introduction

Consider the following problem: there exists a sender  $\mathbf{S}$  and a receiver  $\mathbf{R}$ , who are part of a large distributed network and connected by  $n$  disjoint channels. There exists a *computationally unbounded adversary*, who can listen and forge communication over some of these channels in any arbitrary manner. However, neither  $\mathbf{S}$ , nor  $\mathbf{R}$  knows which of the channels are under the control of the adversary.  $\mathbf{S}$  has a message  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$ , which is a sequence of  $\ell$  elements from a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , where  $\ell \geq 1$ . The challenge is to design a protocol, such that after interacting with  $\mathbf{S}$  as per the protocol, the following should hold at  $\mathbf{R}$ 's end:

1. **Perfect Reliability:**  $\mathbf{R}$  outputs  $m^{\mathbf{R}} = m^{\mathbf{S}}$ .
2. **Perfect Secrecy:** Adversary should not get any *extra* information about  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$ . In other words,  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$  should be *information theoretically secure*.

This problem is called *perfectly secure message transmission* (PSMT) [12].

**Motivation and Different Models for Studying PSMT.** PSMT is a well known and fundamental problem in secure distributed computing. If  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  are directly connected by a secure channel, as assumed in generic *multiparty computation* (MPC) protocols [3,4,29], then PSMT is trivial. However, if  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  are not directly connected by a secure channel, then PSMT protocols help to simulate a *virtual secure channel* between  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$ . The second motivation for PSMT is to achieve information theoretic security. The security of all existing public key cryptosystems is based on hardness assumptions of certain number theoretic problems and security of these schemes holds only against a computationally bounded adversary. However, with the advent of new computing paradigms like Quantum computing [33] and with the increase in computing speed, these assumptions may tend to be useless. But all these factors have no effect on PSMT protocols, as security of these protocols holds good against a computationally unbounded adversary.

Over the past two decades, PSMT problem has been studied by several researchers in different settings. Specifically, we can consider the following settings:

1. **Type of Channels:** The channels between  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  can be *bi-directional*. This setting has been considered in [12,31,16,36,1,13,19,26,24]. On the other hand, channels may be *uni-directional*, having direction associated with them [10,23,21,40,6].
2. **Adversary Capacity:** The adversary may be characterized by a *threshold*, say  $t$ , such that the adversary can control *any*  $t$  out of the  $n$  channels [12,31,36,19] or the adversary may be characterized as a more general *non-threshold* adversary, specified by an adversary structure [16,28,40,41,17,18].
3. **Adversary Behavior:** The adversary may be *static* who corrupts the same channels throughout the protocol [12,31,36,19] or the adversary may be *mobile*, who corrupts different set of channels, during different stages of the protocol [39,26,5,27].

4. **Type of Underlying Network:** The underlying network may be *synchronous*, where there is a global clock in the system and the delay in the transmission over any channel is bounded by a constant [12,31,36,38,19] or the network may be *asynchronous*, having no such global clock [30,6].

Any PSMT protocol is analyzed by the following parameters:

1. **Round Complexity:** It is the number of communication rounds taken by the protocol, where a round is a communication from **S** to **R** or vice-versa.
2. **Communication Complexity:** It is the total number of field elements sent by **S** and **R** in the protocol.
3. **Computational Complexity:** It is amount of computation which is done by **S** and **R** in the protocol.

We call a PSMT protocol against a non-threshold adversary as *efficient*, if the round complexity, communication complexity and computational complexity of the protocol is *polynomial* in  $n$  and the size of the Monotone Span Programme (MSP) for *the adversary structure* (adversary structure is presented in Sec. 1.1 and MSP is presented Sec. 2). On the other hand, a PSMT protocol against a  $t$ -active threshold adversary is called *efficient*, if its round, communication and computational complexity is polynomial in  $n$  and  $t$ . Irrespective of the settings in which PSMT problem is studied, the following questions are fundamental:

- **Possibility:** What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of any PSMT protocol, tolerating a given type of adversary?
- **Feasibility:** Once the possibility of a protocol is ascertained, the next obvious question is whether there exists an *efficient* protocol or not?
- **Optimality:** Given a message of some specific length, what is the lower bound on the round complexity and communication complexity of any PSMT protocol to send the message? Moreover, do we have a protocol, whose total round complexity and communication complexity matches these bounds?

Different techniques are used to answer the above questions in different settings. For details, see [7]. The issue of **Possibility**, **Feasibility** and **Optimality** of PSMT has been completely resolved tolerating *threshold adversary*. However, not too much is known regarding the **Feasibility** and **Optimality** of protocols against non-threshold adversary (see [7] for complete details).

### 1.1 Non-Threshold Adversary

Let the set of  $n$  channels be denoted by  $\mathcal{W} = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$ . Then a *threshold adversary* is characterized by a threshold  $t$ , such that the adversary can control any  $t$  channels out of the  $n$  channels for corruption. We denote such an adversary by  $\mathcal{A}_t$ . On the other hand, a *non-threshold general adversary*  $\mathcal{A}$  is characterized by an *adversary structure*  $\Gamma$ , which is a collection of subsets of channels that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can *potentially* corrupt. That is,

$$\Gamma = \{B \subset \mathcal{W} \mid \mathcal{A} \text{ can corrupt } B\}.$$

Moreover, we assume that if  $B \in \Gamma$  and if  $B' \subset B$ , then  $B' \in \Gamma$ . It is easy to see that a threshold adversary is a special case of non-threshold adversary, such that all possible  $B \subset \mathcal{W}$  with  $|B| \leq t$ , are present in  $\Gamma$ .

**Definition 1 ( $Q^k$  Condition [15]).** We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies the  $Q^k$  condition with respect to  $\mathcal{W}$ , if there exists no  $k$  sets in  $\Gamma$ , which adds up to the whole set  $\mathcal{W}$ . That is:

$$\forall B_1, \dots, B_k \in \Gamma : B_1 \cup \dots \cup B_k \neq \mathcal{W}.$$

**PSMT Tolerating Non-Threshold Adversary.** Modeling the adversary by a threshold helps in easy characterization of protocols and it also helps in analyzing protocols. However, as mentioned in [15], modeling the (dis)trust in the network as a threshold adversary is not always appropriate because threshold protocol requires more *stringent* requirements than the reality [16]. Motivated by this, Kumar et al. [16] studied PSMT tolerating non-threshold adversary for the first time in the literature. The work of Kumar et al. is followed by [11,28,17,40,41], where the issues related to the **Possibility** and **Feasibility** of PSMT against non-threshold adversary have been studied. In short, there exists efficient PSMT protocols tolerating non-threshold adversary for bi-directional channels [41,17] as well as for uni-directional channels [41]. However, there exists another variant of PSMT, known as *almost perfectly secure message transmission* (almost-PSMT), which got relatively less attention in the context of non-threshold adversary.

## 1.2 Almost Perfectly Secure Message Transmission: Almost-PSMT

In PSMT, it is required that  $\mathbf{R}$  should output  $m^{\mathbf{R}} = m^{\mathbf{S}}$  without any error. In [14], the authors considered a variant of PSMT called almost-PSMT, where they relaxed this requirement. Specifically, a protocol is called almost-PSMT, if it satisfies the following requirements:

1. **Perfect Secrecy:** Same as in the case of PSMT.
2. **Almost Perfect Reliability:**  $\mathbf{R}$  outputs  $m^{\mathbf{R}} = m^{\mathbf{S}}$  with probability at least  $1 - 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ , where  $\kappa$  is the error parameter and  $\kappa > 0$ .

In [14], the authors studied almost-PSMT tolerating threshold adversary and showed that almost-PSMT protocols require less number of channels than PSMT protocols for tolerating a threshold adversary with the same threshold. *That is, allowing a negligible error probability in protocol outcome reduces the connectivity requirement.* The work of [14] is followed by [10,37,20,35,2,9,22] where almost-PSMT tolerating threshold adversary is studied rigorously and the issues related to the **Possibility**, **Feasibility** and **Optimality** of almost-PSMT tolerating threshold adversary has been completely resolved. In summary, all these works show that *allowing a negligible error probability in the protocol output (without compromising the secrecy) results in significant reduction in the round complexity, communication complexity and also connectivity requirement (number of channels) of PSMT protocols.*

*Remark 1. (On the Term almost-PSMT):* In the literature, almost-PSMT protocols are also known by various other names. In [34,37], the authors called these protocols as *probabilistic PSMT* (PPSMT). On the other hand, [25,35] called these protocols as *unconditionally secure message transmission* (USMT) protocols. Finally, [7] called these protocols as *statistically secure message transmission* (SSMT) protocols. However, all the above terms stand for almost-PSMT. In this article, we prefer to use the original name, namely almost-PSMT.

### 1.3 Almost-PSMT Tolerating Non-Threshold Adversary: Motivation of Our Work

Unlike almost-PSMT tolerating threshold adversary, almost-PSMT against non-threshold adversary has got very less attention. In [25], Patra et al. have studied almost-PSMT tolerating non-threshold adversary. They showed that *single round as well as multi-round almost-PSMT* is possible iff  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $Q^2$  condition. This is to be compared with the results of [11] and [16], according to which *single round* and *multi-round* PSMT is possible iff  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $Q^3$  and  $Q^2$  condition respectively. Unfortunately, the almost-PSMT protocol tolerating non-threshold adversary presented in [25] is very inefficient and requires computation and communication complexity, which is exponential in the size of adversary structure<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, it requires at least three rounds. In [25], the authors have left it as an open problem to design efficient almost-PSMT protocol tolerating non-threshold adversary, satisfying  $Q^2$  condition. In this paper, we solve this open problem.

### 1.4 Our Results and Comparison with the Existing Results

In this paper, we present the first single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating non-threshold adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , specified by an adversary structure, satisfying  $Q^2$  condition. Our protocol is *round optimal*, requiring minimum number of rounds. Moreover, our protocol is very simple and efficient and thus significantly outperforms the almost-PSMT protocol of [25].

As a special case of our single round protocol, when we restrict it to *threshold adversary*, we get a single round *communication optimal* almost-PSMT tolerating threshold adversary. Though there exists single round, communication optimal almost-PSMT protocol tolerating threshold adversary [35], we find that our protocol is much more *computationally efficient* and *relatively simpler* than the protocol of [35]. In practical networks like sensor networks, it is desirable to have protocols which perform simple computation. In such a situation, our communication optimal protocol (tolerating threshold adversary) fits the bill more appropriately than the communication optimal protocol of [35].

In [9] the authors have designed single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating threshold adversary, which performs simple computations. However, their protocol is *not communication optimal*. On the other hand, our protocol tolerating threshold adversary enjoys the property of *being both simple and also communication optimal*.

<sup>2</sup> The protocol of [25] does not use LSSS and is based on the principle of Induction.

**Table 1.** Comparison of our almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $Q^2$  adversary structure with best known almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $Q^2$  adversary structure

| Reference  | Number of Rounds | Efficient/Inefficient |
|------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| [25]       | At least three   | Inefficient           |
| This paper | One              | Efficient             |

**Table 2.** Comparison of our single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating threshold adversary with  $n = 2t + 1$  with the best known single round almost-PSMT protocols tolerating threshold adversary with  $n = 2t + 1$ 

| Reference  | Communication Optimal | Computational Complexity       |
|------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| [35]       | Yes                   | Efficient (Polynomial in $n$ ) |
| [9]        | No                    | More efficient than [35]       |
| This paper | Yes                   | More efficient than [35]       |

In Table 1 and 2, we compare our protocols with the best known almost-PSMT protocols in non-threshold and threshold settings respectively.

## 1.5 Tools and Techniques Used in Our Protocol

To design our protocol, we use *Linear Secret Sharing Scheme* (LSSS) [8]. In addition, we also use a new method of authenticating multiple values concurrently in information theoretic sense. Together this leads to our efficient single round almost-PSMT protocol.

## 2 Primitives

Our protocol involves a negligible error probability of  $2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ . To bound the error probability by  $2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ , our protocol operates over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , where  $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^\kappa$ . In our protocol, the error probability comes from the fact that adversary has to guess a value (unknown to the adversary), selected uniformly and randomly by  $\mathbf{S}$  from  $\mathbb{F}$ . If the adversary can correctly guess the value, then the protocol output will be incorrect. However, the probability of this event is  $\frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} = 2^{-\kappa}$ . Without loss of generality, we assume that  $\frac{\ell}{|\mathbb{F}|} \approx 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$  and hence is negligible (this is assumed in all the previous almost-PSMT protocols). We now discuss LSSS.

### 2.1 Linear Secret Sharing Scheme: LSSS

In a *secret sharing scheme*, a dealer  $D$  distributes a secret  $s \in \mathbb{F}$ , to a set of  $n$  parties  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$  in such a way that some subsets of the participants (called access sets) can reconstruct  $s$  from their shares, while the other subsets of the participants (called forbidden sets) have no information about  $s$  from their shares. The family of access sets is called *access structure*. Moreover, we assume that the access structure is monotone, which is defined as follows:

**Definition 2.** An access structure  $\Sigma$  is monotone if  $A \in \Sigma$  and  $A' \supseteq A$ , then  $A' \in \Sigma$ .

Corresponding to the access structure  $\Sigma$ , we have the adversary structure  $\Gamma = \Sigma^c$ , where  $c$  denotes the complement. The sets in  $\Gamma$  are called *forbidden* sets. There exists a *computationally unbounded* adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , who can control any set in  $\Gamma$ .

A secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure  $\Sigma$  can be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [8] as follows: Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be a  $d \times e$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}$  and  $\psi : \{1, \dots, d\} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, n\}$  be a labeling function, where  $d \geq e$  and  $d \geq n$ .

### Sharing algorithm

1. To share a secret  $s \in \mathbb{F}$ ,  $D$  first chooses a random vector  $\rho \in \mathbb{F}^{e-1}$  and compute a vector

$$\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_d)^T = \mathcal{M} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} s \\ \rho \end{pmatrix}. \quad (1)$$

2. Let

$$\text{LSSS}(s, \rho) = (\text{share}_1, \dots, \text{share}_n), \quad (2)$$

where  $\text{share}_i = \{v_j \mid \psi(j) = i\}$ . The dealer gives  $\text{share}_i$  to  $P_i$  as a share of  $s$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .

**Reconstruction algorithm:** A set of parties  $A \in \Sigma$  can reconstruct the secret  $s$  if and only if  $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$  is in the linear span of

$$\mathcal{M}_A = \{m_j \mid \psi(j) \in A\},$$

where  $m_j$  denotes the  $j$ th row of  $\mathcal{M}$ . If this is indeed the case then there exists a vector  $\alpha_A$  called *recombination vector*, such that  $\alpha_A \cdot \mathcal{M}_A = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$ . Let  $\mathbf{s}_A$  denote the set of shares corresponding to the parties in  $A$ . Then the parties in  $A$  can reconstruct  $s$  by computing  $s = \langle \alpha_A, \mathbf{s}_A^T \rangle$ , where  $\langle x, y \rangle$  denotes the *dot product* of  $x$  and  $y$  and  $x^T$  denotes the transpose of  $x$ .

**Definition 3 (Monotone Span Programme (MSP) [8]).** We say that the above  $(\mathcal{M}, \psi)$  is a monotone span program which realizes  $\Sigma$ . The size of the MSP is the number of rows  $d$  in  $M$ .

**Theorem 1 ([8]).** The above algorithm constitutes a valid secret sharing scheme.

We are now ready to present our protocol.

## 3 Efficient Single Round Almost-PSMT Protocol Tolerating Non-Threshold Adversary

Let  $\mathcal{W} = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$  be the set of  $n$  channels between  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a non-threshold adversary, specified by an adversary structure  $\Gamma$  over  $\mathcal{W}$ . Moreover, let  $\Sigma = \Gamma^c$  be the corresponding access structure over  $\mathcal{W}$ . Furthermore, let

$\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $\mathcal{Q}^2$  condition with respect to  $\mathcal{W}$ , which is necessary for the existence of any almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}$ . During the protocol,  $\mathcal{A}$  can select any set of channels  $B \in \Gamma$  for corruption. However, before the beginning of the protocol, neither  $\mathbf{S}$  nor  $\mathbf{R}$  will know which set of channels are under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ . The channels which are under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$  are called *corrupted*. On the other hand, the channels not under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$  are called *honest*.

Let  $(\mathcal{M}, \psi)$  be the MSP realizing the access structure  $\Sigma$ . *Without loss of generality and for simplicity, we assume that only  $i^{\text{th}}$  row of  $\mathcal{M}$  is assigned to channel  $w_i$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .* Thus,

$$\mathcal{M} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{m}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{m}_n \end{pmatrix}$$

is an  $n \times e$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}$ . *However, our protocol will also work when more than one row of  $\mathcal{M}$  is assigned to some  $w_i$ .* Finally we use the following notation in our protocol:

**Notation 1.** *Let  $\mathcal{Q}$  be any subset of  $\mathcal{W}$  i.e.  $\mathcal{Q} \subseteq \mathcal{W}$ . Then  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{Q}}$  denotes the matrix containing the rows of  $\mathcal{M}$  corresponding to the channels in  $\mathcal{Q}$ . For example, if  $\mathcal{Q} = \{w_1, \dots, w_t\}$ , then*

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{Q}} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{m}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{m}_t \end{pmatrix}.$$

### 3.1 Underlying Idea of the Protocol

The high level idea of the protocol is as follows: let the message  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$ , which is a sequence of  $\ell$  elements from  $\mathbb{F}$  be denoted by  $m^{\mathbf{S}} = [m_1^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, m_{\ell}^{\mathbf{S}}]$ . Now using the MSP  $\mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathbf{S}$  generates  $\text{LSSS}(m_i^{\mathbf{S}}, \rho_i) = (\text{share}_{i1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, \text{share}_{in}^{\mathbf{S}})$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ , where  $\rho_i$ 's are the randomness used by  $\mathbf{S}$ .

If  $\mathbf{S}$  sends the  $j^{\text{th}}$  share of all the  $\ell$   $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's, namely  $\text{share}_{ij}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , over  $w_j$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , then the communication preserves the secrecy of  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$ . This is because  $\mathcal{A}$  can control any one set from the adversary structure  $\Gamma$  and hence will get the shares of each  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's, sent over those channels. However, from the properties of MSP, these shares will not reveal any information about  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

However,  $\mathbf{S}$  cannot ensure that  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$  will be recovered correctly by  $\mathbf{R}$  by simply sending the shares. This is because  $\mathcal{A}$  may corrupt the shares sent over the channels under its control and there will be no way by which  $\mathbf{R}$  can detect which channels have delivered correct shares. This is because there is only one round in the protocol. So  $\mathbf{S}$  also need to send some *additional* information to authenticate each share, which can assist  $\mathbf{R}$  to detect the corrupted shares with very high probability. So in our protocol,  $\mathbf{S}$  also sends additional authentication information, using which  $\mathbf{R}$  can detect the corrupted shares with very high probability (the way this is done is explained in the next section).



Though this mechanism of sending the shares, along with their authentication information is also used in the earlier almost-PSMT protocols, we use a new way of sending the authentication information, which is relatively simpler than the earlier schemes. After removing the corrupted shares,  $\mathbf{R}$  will be left with the shares, which are correctly delivered with very high probability. Among these shares, there will be a set of shares which are delivered over the *honest* channels and hence they correspond to shares of the wires that constitute an access set. So if  $\mathbf{R}$  applies the reconstruction algorithm of the LSSS to the retained shares,  $\mathbf{R}$  will correctly recover each  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$  with very high probability.

### 3.2 Sending the Authentication Information

In our protocol, the authentication of shares is done in the following way: corresponding to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  share of all the  $\ell$   $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's, sender  $\mathbf{S}$  constructs a polynomial  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  of degree  $\ell-1$  as follows:  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x) = \text{share}_{1_j}^{\mathbf{S}} + \text{share}_{2_j}^{\mathbf{S}} \cdot x + \dots + \text{share}_{\ell_j}^{\mathbf{S}} \cdot x^{\ell-1}$ . Now  $\mathbf{S}$  associates  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  with channel  $w_j$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$  and sends it over  $w_j$  (by sending the coefficients of  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  over  $w_j$ ). This is same as sending all the  $j^{\text{th}}$  shares over  $w_j$ .

Now  $\mathbf{S}$  associates a *random evaluation point*  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  with every channel  $w_k$ , for  $k = 1, \dots, n$ . If  $\mathbf{S}$  sends  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  and  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}})$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$  over  $w_k$ , then it achieves the following: if  $w_j$  is *corrupted* and if  $w_k$  is *honest*, then  $w_j$  cannot deliver  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x) \neq p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  to  $\mathbf{R}$  over  $w_j$  without being caught by  $w_k$  with very high probability. This is because  $\mathcal{A}$  will have no information about  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  sent over  $w_k$  and also  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}$  received by  $\mathbf{R}$  over  $w_k$  is same as  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ . So except with probability  $\frac{\ell-1}{|\mathbb{F}|}$ ,  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}) \neq p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}})$ . This is because two different polynomials of degree  $\ell-1$  can have at most  $\ell-1$  common roots and  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  is randomly selected from  $\mathbb{F}$ . By appropriately selecting  $\mathbb{F}$ , we can ensure that  $\frac{\ell-1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \approx 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ , which is negligible. So this can help to detect corrupted shares.

However, the above communication may breach the secrecy as follows: if  $P_j$  is *honest* and  $P_k$  is *corrupted*, then earlier adversary would have no information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , as no information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  would have been sent over  $w_k$ . But now, adversary will know  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}})$ , as well as  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  through  $w_k$ , thus revealing information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  and hence about  $j^{\text{th}}$  share of all  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's. To avoid this situation, we use the following idea: corresponding to channel  $w_j$ ,  $\mathbf{S}$  selects  $n$  random *masking keys*, denoted by  $key_{j_1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, key_{j_n}^{\mathbf{S}}$ . All the  $n$  masking keys (associated with  $w_j$ ) are sent over  $w_j$ . Now the authentication of  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  corresponding to the evaluation point  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ , namely  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}})$ , is masked with the  $k^{\text{th}}$  masking key, namely  $key_{j_k}^{\mathbf{S}}$  and sent over  $w_k$ . That is, over  $w_k$ ,  $\mathbf{S}$  sends  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}) + key_{j_k}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , instead of only  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}})$ . Notice that  $key_{j_k}^{\mathbf{S}}$  is not sent over  $w_k$ . So if the adversary controls  $w_k$ , then even after knowing  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  and  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}) + key_{j_k}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , adversary will not gain any information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , as he has no information about the  $k^{\text{th}}$  masking key  $key_{j_k}^{\mathbf{S}}$  associated with  $w_j$ . This way, we preserve the secrecy of each  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , sent over honest  $p_j$ 's. The interesting fact is that with this communication, we can also ensure that if some  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  is changed by the adversary over some corrupted  $w_j$ , then it will be detected with very high probability by an *honest*  $w_k$ .

**Remark 2. (Comparison with the earlier mechanisms of authenticating shares)** As mentioned earlier, all the previous almost-PSMT protocols also used the idea of sending the authentication information of the shares, along with the shares. However, these protocols perform the authentication of each individual  $j^{\text{th}}$  share separately, corresponding to each of the  $\ell$  messages, using the idea of Check vectors [29]. On the other hand, in our scheme, a single authentication information is sent for all the  $j^{\text{th}}$  shares of the  $\ell$  secrets. This way, we achieve more efficiency.

We are now ready to formally present our protocol, which is given in Fig. 1.

We now proceed to prove the properties of the protocol. In the proofs, we will use the following notations (For the definition of VALID, see Fig. 1):

- HW denotes the set of channels in  $\mathcal{W}$  not under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- CW denotes the set of channels in  $\mathcal{W}$  under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- HVALID denotes the set of channels in VALID not under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- CVALID denotes the set of channels in VALID under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Remark 3.** Notice that if some channel is under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$  then it is not necessary that  $\mathcal{A}$  changes all the information sent over the channel. The adversary may or may not change any portion of the information sent over the channels under his control.

**Lemma 1.** *HVALID = HW and hence HVALID constitutes an access set.*

PROOF: First notice that every channel in the set HW will correctly deliver all the information to  $\mathbf{R}$ . Specifically,  $p_k^{\mathbf{R}}(x) = p_k^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ ,  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}} = \alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ ,  $(key_{k1}^{\mathbf{R}}, \dots, key_{kn}^{\mathbf{R}}) = (key_{k1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, key_{kn}^{\mathbf{S}})$  and  $val_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}} = val_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , for every channel  $w_k \in \text{HW}$ . So the condition  $val_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}} = p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}) + key_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}}$  holds for every  $w_j, w_k \in \text{HW}$ . Moreover, HW constitutes an access set. Thus, the condition  $\mathcal{W} \setminus \text{SUPPORT}_j \in \Gamma$  will hold for every channel  $w_j \in \text{HW}$ . Thus, every channel in HW will be present in VALID and hence HVALID = HW.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.** *Every channel  $w_j \in \text{VALID}$  will deliver  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x) = p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , except with error probability  $2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ .*

PROOF: The proof holds without any error probability if  $w_j \in \text{HVALID}$ . So we now consider the case when  $w_j \in \text{CVALID}$ . So let  $w_j$  be a channel in CVALID. Since  $w_j \in \text{CVALID}$  (and hence VALID), it implies that  $\mathcal{W} \setminus \text{SUPPORT}_j \in \Gamma$ . This further implies that there exists at least one channel in  $\text{SUPPORT}_j$ , say  $w_k$ , such that  $w_k$  is not under the control of the adversary. Otherwise, it implies that  $\text{SUPPORT}_j \in \Gamma$  and hence  $\mathcal{A}$  does not satisfy  $\mathcal{Q}^2$  condition with respect to  $\mathcal{W}$ , which is a contradiction.

Now since  $w_k$  is not under the control of  $\mathcal{A}$ , it implies that  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}} = \alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$  and also  $val_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}} = val_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ . Moreover,  $\mathcal{A}$  will have no information about  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}$  and  $val_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}}$ . Now suppose adversary changes  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , so that  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x) \neq p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ . However, since  $w_k \in \text{SUPPORT}_j$ , it implies that  $val_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}} = p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}) + key_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}}$ . But adversary can ensure the same only if he can correctly guess  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}} = \alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ . However, adversary can do the same with probability at most  $\frac{\ell-1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \approx 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ .  $\square$

**Computation by S:**

1. For  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ , **S** computes  $\text{LSSS}(m_i^{\mathbf{S}}, \rho_i) = (\text{share}_{i1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, \text{share}_{in}^{\mathbf{S}})$ .
2. For  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , corresponding to channel  $w_k$ , **S** selects a random value  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ , called as  $k^{\text{th}}$  evaluation point.
3. For  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , corresponding to the  $j^{\text{th}}$  share of all the  $\ell$   $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's, **S** constructs a polynomial  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  of degree  $\ell - 1$  as follows:

$$p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x) = \text{share}_{1j}^{\mathbf{S}} + \text{share}_{2j}^{\mathbf{S}} \cdot x + \dots + \text{share}_{\ell j}^{\mathbf{S}} \cdot x^{\ell-1}.$$

4. For  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , **S** evaluates each  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  at evaluation point  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ , for  $k = 1, \dots, n$ .
5. For  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , corresponding to channel  $w_j$ , **S** selects  $n$  random, non-zero values  $\text{key}_{j1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, \text{key}_{jn}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , called as *masking keys*.

**Round I: Communication from S to R:** For  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , **S** sends the following to **R** over channel  $w_k$  and terminates the protocol.

1. Polynomial  $p_k^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ .
2. Evaluation point  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}$ .
3.  $n$  masking keys  $\text{key}_{k1}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, \text{key}_{kn}^{\mathbf{S}}$ .
4. Masked authentication values  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , where  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}} = p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}) + \text{key}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ .

**Information Received by R:** For  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , let **R** receive the following from **S** over channel  $w_k$ :

1. Polynomial  $p_k^{\mathbf{R}}(x)$ .
2. Evaluation point  $\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}$ .
3.  $n$  masking keys  $\text{key}_{k1}^{\mathbf{R}}, \dots, \text{key}_{kn}^{\mathbf{R}}$ .
4. Masked authentication values  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}}$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, n$ .

**Message Recovery by R:** **R** does the following computation:

1. **R** initializes a set  $\text{VALID} = \emptyset$ .
2. For  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , corresponding to channel  $w_j$ , **R** constructs a set  $\text{SUPPORT}_j = \emptyset$ .
3. **R** adds channel  $w_k$  in  $\text{SUPPORT}_j$  if  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}} = p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{R}}) + \text{key}_{jk}^{\mathbf{R}}$ .
4. For  $j = 1, \dots, n$ , **R** adds channel  $w_j$  to  $\text{VALID}$  if  $\mathcal{W} \setminus \text{SUPPORT}_j \in \Gamma$ <sup>a</sup>.
5. Without loss of generality, let  $w_1, \dots, w_t$  be the channels in  $\text{VALID}$ . Moreover, for  $j = 1, \dots, t$ , let  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x)$  be of the form

$$p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x) = \text{share}_{1j}^{\mathbf{R}} + \text{share}_{2j}^{\mathbf{R}} \cdot x + \dots + \text{share}_{\ell j}^{\mathbf{R}} \cdot x^{\ell-1}.$$

6. For  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ , **R** applies reconstruction algorithm of the LSSS to  $\text{share}_{i1}^{\mathbf{R}}, \text{share}_{i2}^{\mathbf{R}}, \dots, \text{share}_{it}^{\mathbf{R}}$  and reconstructs  $m_i^{\mathbf{R}}$ .
7. Finally **R** reconstructs  $m^{\mathbf{R}} = [m_1^{\mathbf{R}}, \dots, m_\ell^{\mathbf{R}}]$  and terminates the protocol.

<sup>a</sup> This can be done efficiently by checking whether the target vector  $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$  lies in the span of the rows assigned to the parties in the set  $\mathcal{W} \setminus \text{SUPPORT}_j$  in  $\mathcal{M}$ .

**Fig. 1.** Efficient Single Round Almost-PSMT Tolerating  $\mathcal{Q}^2$  Adversary Structure

**Lemma 3 (Perfect Secrecy).** *The protocol in Fig. 1 satisfies perfect secrecy condition.*

PROOF: If  $w_k \in \text{CW}$ , then adversary will know the polynomial  $p_k^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  and hence the shares  $\text{share}_{1k}^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, \text{share}_{\ell k}^{\mathbf{S}}$ . However, even after knowing all the polynomials transmitted through the channels in CW, adversary will not know  $m_1^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, m_{\ell}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , as adversary will only come to know the shares of  $m_1^{\mathbf{S}}, \dots, m_{\ell}^{\mathbf{S}}$  sent through the channels in CW and  $\text{CW} \in \Gamma$ . However, the adversary will also know  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}} = p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(\alpha_k^{\mathbf{S}}) + \text{key}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , corresponding to every  $w_j \in \text{HW}$ , which is transmitted through every  $w_k \in \text{CW}$ . However, such  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's will not reveal any extra information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$  (corresponding to any  $P_j$  in HW) to the adversary, as the adversary will have no information about the masking key  $\text{key}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ , which is only sent over  $w_j$ . Thus,  $\text{val}_{jk}^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's corresponding to every  $w_j \in \text{HW}$ , which are transmitted through every  $p_k \in \text{CW}$  will not reveal any information about  $p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ 's corresponding to  $w_j$ 's in HW. Thus, through the information received over the channels in CW, adversary will not get any information about  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's and hence the message  $m^{\mathbf{S}}$ .

**Lemma 4 (Almost Perfect Reliability).** *The protocol in Fig. 1 satisfies almost perfect reliability condition.*

PROOF: To prove the lemma, we have to show that the shares (of  $m_i^{\mathbf{S}}$ 's) received by  $\mathbf{R}$  over the channels in VALID are correct shares, except with error probability  $2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ . This further implies that every channel  $w_j \in \text{VALID}$  has delivered  $p_j^{\mathbf{R}}(x) = p_j^{\mathbf{S}}(x)$ , except with error probability  $2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ . However, this follows from Lemma 2.  $\square$

**Lemma 5 (Computation and Communication Complexity).** *In the protocol of Fig. 1,  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  performs computation which is polynomial in the size of the underlying LSSS. In the protocol,  $\mathbf{S}$  sends  $\mathcal{O}(\ell n + n^2)$  field elements from  $\mathbb{F}$  to  $\mathbf{R}$ .*

PROOF: The computational complexity is easy to verify. We now analyze the communication complexity. Through each channel,  $\mathbf{S}$  sends a polynomial of degree  $\ell - 1$ , one evaluation point,  $n$  masking keys and  $n$  authenticated values. This results in a total communication complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(\ell n + n^2)$  field elements.  $\square$

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  be connected by  $n$  channels and let there exists a computationally unbounded adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , specified by an adversary structure  $\Gamma$  over the  $n$  channels, such that  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $\mathcal{Q}^2$  condition. Then there exists an efficient single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}$ .*

PROOF: The proof follows from Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.  $\square$

## 4 Simple and Computationally Efficient Single Round Almost-PSMT Tolerating Threshold Adversary with Optimum Communication Complexity

As discussed earlier, a threshold adversary  $\mathcal{A}_t$  is a special type of non-threshold adversary where the adversary structure  $\Gamma$  consists of all possible subsets of  $\mathcal{W}$  of size at most  $t$ . We now recall the following results from [25].

**Theorem 3 ([25]).** *Any almost-PSMT (irrespective of the number of rounds) tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$  is possible iff  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  are connected by  $n \geq 2t + 1$  channels. Moreover, any single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$  has to communicate  $\Omega\left(\frac{n\ell}{n-2t}\right)$  field elements to send a message containing  $\ell$  field elements.*

*Remark 4.* In any almost-PSMT protocol,  $|\mathbb{F}|$  is selected as a function of the error parameter  $\kappa$  (normally  $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^\kappa$ ) and thus each field element can be represented by a number of bits, which will be function of  $\kappa$ . So though  $\kappa$  does not figure explicitly in the expression for communication complexity in Theorem 3, it is implied implicitly if we look into the total number of bits that are actually communicated.

Any single round almost-PSMT protocol designed with  $n = 2t + 1$  channels is said to have *optimal resilience*. Substituting  $n = 2t + 1$  in the above theorem, we find that any single round almost-PSMT protocol with optimal resilience has to communicate  $\Omega(n\ell)$  field elements to send a message containing  $\ell$  field elements. Thus any single round, optimally resilient, almost-PSMT protocol whose total communication complexity is  $\mathcal{O}(n\ell)$  is said to be *communication optimal*.

In [35,25], the authors presented an efficient<sup>3</sup> single round, optimally resilient almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$ . However, the protocol performs some complex (though efficient) computations, like *extrapolation technique*, *extracting randomness*, etc<sup>4</sup> to achieve its task. In practical networks like sensor network, it is desirable to design protocols which perform computationally simple steps. Motivated by this, the authors in [9] have designed a very simple, optimally resilient, single round almost-PSMT tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$ . However, their protocol is not communication optimal. Specifically, their protocol sends  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$  field elements to send a message containing one field element.

We now show that our single round almost-PSMT protocol against non-threshold adversary when restricted to threshold adversary is a single round, optimally resilient, almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$  having *optimal communication complexity*. Moreover, the protocol is efficient. Furthermore, the protocol is very simple and performs much simpler steps (by avoiding steps like extrapolation technique, extracting randomness) than the communication optimal single round almost-PSMT protocol of [35].

<sup>3</sup> The computation and communication complexity of the protocol are polynomial in  $n$  and  $\ell$ .

<sup>4</sup> See [7] for the detailed presentation of the single round almost-PSMT protocol of [35].

The first observation is that if the adversary is specified by a threshold  $t$  and if the underlying adversary structure satisfies  $\mathcal{Q}^2$  condition, then it implies that  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  are connected by  $n \geq 2t + 1$  channels. Moreover, it is well known that there exists a very simple MSP tolerating a threshold adversary with threshold  $t$ , such that there are exactly  $n$  rows in the MSP and one row of the MSP is assigned to each channel. The MSP is nothing but an  $n \times (t + 1)$  Vandermonde matrix [8]. The resultant secret sharing scheme is known as Shamir secret sharing scheme [32]. So now with these observations, if we simply execute the protocol of previous section assuming that the adversary is a threshold adversary and there are  $n = 2t + 1$  channels between  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$ , we get a simple, efficient, optimally resilient, single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$ , which communicates  $\mathcal{O}(\ell n + n^2)$  field elements to send a message containing  $\ell$  field elements. Now if we set  $\ell = n$ , then we find that the protocol sends a message containing  $n$  field elements by communicating  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$  field elements. From Theorem 3, any single round optimally resilient almost-PSMT protocol has to communicate  $\Omega(n^2)$  field elements to securely send a message containing  $n$  field elements. Thus our resultant protocol is communication optimal. We now state this in the following theorem:

**Theorem 4.** *Let  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  be connected by  $n = 2t + 1$  channels. Moreover, let  $\mathbf{S}$  has a message containing  $\ell = n$  field elements. Then there exists a simple, efficient, optimally resilient, communication optimal single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating  $\mathcal{A}_t$ .*

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we resolved one of the open problems raised in [25] by designing an optimally resilient, single round, efficient almost-PSMT protocol tolerating non-threshold adversary. This is the first ever efficient single round almost-PSMT protocol tolerating non-threshold adversary. When restricted to threshold adversary, we get a simple, efficient, optimally resilient, single round communication optimal almost-PSMT protocol.

**Acknowledgments.** We would like to thank the anonymous referees of ACNS 2011 for several useful suggestions.

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